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A Retroactivity Retrospective,
With Thoughts for the Future:
What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul
Mishkin,
and What it Might
Kermit Roosevelt IIIt
INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1965, the Supreme Court decided Linkletter v. Walker,l in
which it asserted a general power to specify the "retroactive" scope of its
decisions. In November of that same year, Paul Mishkin published his
Harvard Law Review Foreword The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process ofTime and Law.2 Mishkin identified Linkletter as a case that,
"though less likely to attract immediate attention" than coevals such as
Griswold v. Connecticut,3 "may well prove as significant over the years."4
The forecast was prescient; Linkletter has had serious consequences in a
wide range of fields. In the specific area of retroactivity, it set the Court
upon an odyssey that continues to this day.
Mishkin also characterized the decision as "basically unwise,"s an
assessment that proved equally accurate. Linkletter was a serious mistake,
and most of the Court's struggles with retroactivity over the years have
been an attempt to resolve the puzzles it created. In this article, I will first
discuss Linkletter and Mishkin's critique. I will then look at the Court's
struggle with Linkletter's legacy, attempting to offer some insight as to
Copyright © 2007 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to the participants at the
Mishkin Symposium for their comments and insight, to John Y00 and Jesse Choper for their
organizational skills, and to Paul Mishkin for education and inspiration in equal parts.
\. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
2. 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 56.
5. ld. at 58.
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how the deficiencies of the current approach derive from Linkletter and
could be ameliorated by a fuller,-acceptance of Mishkin's views. Last, I will
offer specific thoughts on the retroactivity problem currently before the
Court.
That problem is what retroactive effect should be given the line of
cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey6 and culminating in United
States v. Booker,? which invalidated the mandatory aspect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Booker suggests that a vast number of federal
sentences have been imposed in an unconstitutional fashion, and full
retroactive application threatens tremendous disruption. We can achieve a
proper balance between systemic disruption and justice to individuals, I
will suggest, by heeding Paul Mishkin's basic insights. We ought not to
think in terms of retroactivity at all. Instead, we need only ask, according to
our best current understanding of the law, whether the pre-Booker
imposition of sentences violated the constitutional rights of individual
defendants, and if so, whether those wrongs merit a remedy.8
I
LINKLE7TER
Linkletter dealt with the aftermath of Mapp v. Ohio,9 which had held
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp overturned WolfJv. Colorado,1O which had
allowed the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in state court. It thus
called into question the many convictions of state court defendants
obtained in proceedings involving the introduction of such evidence.
By the time the Court decided Linkletter, it had already applied the
Mapp rule to cases that reached it via direct review. ll It was clear, then,
that Mapp would upset state convictions at least to that extent: defendants
whose convictions had not become final at the time Mapp was decided
were entitled to its benefits. The question confronting the Linkletter Court
was how to deal with a different class of litigants: those (like Linketter)
whose convictions had become final by the time of Mapp and who now
sought to challenge those convictions via petitions for writs of habeas
corpus.
6. 530 U.s. 466 (2000).
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
8. In an earlier article, I argued that we would be better off without the concept of retroactivity
at all. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Retroactivity]. This Article refines
that analysis by incorporating new work in constitutional theory and applies it to the Booker problem.
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S 23 (1964).
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It was to answer this question that Linkletter introduced the concept of
nonretroactivity. A new rule of law such.as that produced by the overruling
of Wolf, the Court announced, should be given effect in cases on direct
review. But as far as collateral attacks on final decisions were concerned,
no "set principle" governed, and "in appropriate cases the Court may in the
interest of justice make the rule prospective."!2 The assertion of what
Mishkin called "a broad judicial power of prospective limitation"!3 was
plain enough, but the font of this power remained somewhat turbid.
Though Linkletter cites several prior cases, it acknowledges that they are
distinguishable l4 and investigation suggests that these cases feature what I
have called "spurious nonretroactivity."15 They are examples of federal
courts refusing to apply law-changing state-court state-law decisions to
pre-decision events-an outcome resembling Linkletter's idea of
prospectivity. But these cases rest less on the idea that judicial decisions
may be given only prospective effect than on the principle that federal
courts are not bound by "unsettled" state-court readings of state law. That
is, they are concerned not with retroactivity but primarily with the
allocation of interpretive authority between state and federal courts on
questions of state law under the regime of Swift v. Tyson. 16
So the concept of nonretroactivity on which Linkletter relied did not
lie already in the judicial arsenal. It was crafted to solve a particular
problem-to prevent habeas petitioners from claiming the benefits of new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure. To assess the wisdom of this
innovation, we need to examine several subsidiary issues.
The first is the gravity of the problem. The Linkletter dissenters,
Douglas and Black, denied that any distinction between direct and
collateral review needed to be made. They would have allowed Linkletter a
new trial at which the unconstitutionally seized evidence would be
excluded. I?
That approach might have been tolerable in Linkletter itself. As
Justice Black's dissent pointed out, a state's reliance on the ability of its
prosecutors to use evidence its police had obtained in knowing violation of
the Fourth Amendment is not the purest innocence. 18 And as Black also
argued, some of the Court's statements about the nature of the exclusionary
rule had made it sound like a remedy mandated by the Constitution and
12. Linkletter, 38\ U.S. 479, 627, 628 (1965).
13. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 59.
14. As Mishkin points out, see id.
15. Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1084, n.44.
16. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842) (holding that federal courts are not bound by state court
interpretations of general common law). See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1084-87
(discussing pre-Linkletter "spurious nonretroactivity" cases).
17. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 653 (Black, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 652 (Black, J., dissenting).
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thus beyond the power of judges to withhold, even on collateral review. 19
But in subsequent cases, such as Miranda v. Arizona,2° the Court created
rules that states could not have anticipated and whose precise specifications
were plainly not drawn directly from the Constitution. No state, regardless
of its good faith, could have been expected to have its police officers
administer the Miranda warning before the Court created it. Invalidating
final convictions on the basis of such new rules would indeed have had
unacceptable consequences; it would have punished states for
constitutional violations they had no way to avoid.21
So some solution was needed.22 To evaluate the one Linkletter offered,
we need to consider its costs and benefits, and how they compare to those
of alternative approaches. I will argue, as Mishkin did, that Linketter's
creation of nonretroactivity was an unwise choice, one which both failed to
achieve its goals and carried significant costs. In fact, Linkletter's
innovation was worse than useless. The problem of collateral claimants
became a problem only because of the changes Linkletter made, and could
have been resolved quite comfortably within existing law.
II
MISHKIN'S RESPONSE
A. Costs
Mishkin identified one main cost of the Linkletter innovation: the
erosion of what the opinion termed the "declaratory theory" of law.23
Conventionally associated with Blackstone, the declaratory theory holds
that courts "simply 'find' or declare a preexisting law and do not exercise
any creative function."24 In its place, Linkletter offered a vision, which it
attributed to Austin, ofjudges who "do something more than discover law;
they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the
vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are
but the empty crevices of the law."25
The relevance of the Austinian view to retroactivity might not be
immediately clear. The reasoning is as follows. On the declaratory theory,
the Court has no power to make law; law's source is never the Court. An
overruled decision is thus simply mistaken, and once the overruling court
19. [d. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. See Mishkin, supra note 2, at 100 (discussing balance between justice and administrability).
22. Assuming, that is, that results such as Miranda were to be reached. A "solution" that 1do not
consider would be for the Court simply never to decide cases in such a way that granting relief on
collateral review would be unacceptably disruptive. This has been suggested. See sources cited infra
note 74.
23. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 n.7.
24. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 59.
25. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24.
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recognizes the mistake, it must also conclude that the law has always been
what it is now declared to be. (This is, notably, the approach the Court has
maintained with respect to retroactivity on questions of statutory
interpretation, where its lawmaking power is minimal.26) On the Austinian
theory, however, the source of much of the law-the interstitial parts-is
nothing more than the Court. An overruled decision may be considered
unwise or misguided, but it comes from a body with lawmaking authority,
and so it cannot be simply mistaken. It is, as Linkletter put, "an existing
juridical fact until overruled."27
The Austinian view of law does not suffice, by itself, to generate the
nonretroactive results that Linkletter sought. One needs, in addition, the
premise that a reviewing court should not disturb decisions which were
correct when rendered. In other words, the reversal of such decisions based
on new law should occur not as a matter of course but only when
"retroactive" application of the new law creates an error justifying
reversa1.28 What the Austinian view can do by itself is to produce the costs
that Mishkin identified.
On the declaratory theory, a court that demands obedience to its
decisions is demanding obedience to the law, and in constitutional cases to
the Constitution-an obedience our political and legal culture
overwhelmingly accepts as duty. But if the source of a decision is only the
court, then the demand is for obedience to the court, at best as an
institution, at worst as a collection of individuals.29 That obedience is a
duty less recognized, and indeed frequently denied.30 By asserting that the
authority behind many rules of law is nothing more than the Court,
Linkletter sapped "the moral force that gives substance not only to the felt
obligation to obey, but to other pervasive attitudes toward the Court that
are essential to the Court's effective operation."31
Mishkin wrote at a time when, as he put it, the symbolism of the
declaratory theory and "the loyalties it commands . . . seem to have
26. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (noting that Teague analysis does not
apply to statutory interpretation); Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1076.
27. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624.
28. In fact, even this premise will not produce the Linkletter result, because it does not
distinguish between direct and collateral review, a fact the Court later realized. See infra Section 1.B.
The alternative is that courts should generally decide cases according to their best current
understanding of the law, what I have termed the "decision-time" as opposed to the "transaction-time"
model. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1078-79.
29. See Mishkin, supra note 2, at 63 (noting "the loss involved if judges could not appeal to the
idea that it is 'the law' or 'the Constitution'-and not they personally-who command a given result").
30. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
31. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 67. The other pervasive attitudes are those that attend the belief that
the Court is a passive interpreter of the law rather than an active producer, e.g., that the social or
political views of the Justices have no effect on their decisions.
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diminished."32 The present is another such time. Denunciations of judicial
activism issue from the executive and legislative branches; in book form,
they ride the New York Times bestseller list. 33 Political science scholarship
frequently models judicial decisionmaking as liberal or conservative in
narrowly partisan terms, as though law and precedent placed no constraints
on the decisions of even lower-court judges.34 And the most recent Harvard
Law Review Foreword, forty years after Mishkin, is titled A Political
Court. 35
The costs of widespread acceptance of the crude political view of
judicial decisionmaking are substantial. If judges are simply political
actors, then there is little reason not to demand that they advance the
policies we prefer, and little reason to heed them when they do not.36 These
consequences might not be considered costs, of course, if the crude
political view were true-if the idea that law is more than politics were
nothing more than a myth designed to lull the credulous while sophisticates
went about their business.
But Blackstone is not just the opiate of the masses. The declaratory
theory, while certainly not true in its most extreme form, captures a crucial
element of the judicial process. 37 Moreover, it is something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The belief that law is more than politics is one of the
things that stops law from becoming merely politics. Values of the legal
culture, such as the need for reasoned justification of judicial decisions,
32. [d. at 68.
33. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 2, 12 (2006) [hereinafter,
ROOSEVELT, MYTH] (discussing charges of activism).
34. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (Cambridge 2002); Richard 1. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in
Administrative Law: Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300. For a rebuttal to some attitudinal studies, see, for example, Michael
C. Dorf, Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT 497 (2007); Ernest Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SuP. CT. REV. I; Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and
Decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
35. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
36. Justice Scalia has made this point eloquently in several places. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 u.s. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring!
dissenting).
37. The key question is what sort of considerations judges may legitimately take into account
when deciding cases that do not have clear answers. Faithful judges understand that they may not rely
on a preference for one litigant or the other; presumably they also understand that they may not rely on
a preference for a particular policy outcome. The permissible considerations are what Jack Balkin and
Sandy Levinson call "high politics," things such as general beliefs about the competencies of courts
versus legislatures, or the circumstances under which the outcome of a democratic process can or
cannot be trusted as a reliable guide to the public interest. See Jack M. Balkin & Sandy Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); ROOSEVELT, MYTH, supra
note 33.
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operate as a constraint on judicial decisionmaking.38 Perhaps more
important, the idea of a distinction between law and politics is inculcated in
future judges during their legal education. If law professors teach that
judges are simply politicians, they can make it true, for they teach the next
generation of judges. And if the Supreme Court rules in ways that suggest
that it enjoys the discretion, of a legislature, future generations, and future
Justices, will believe it. That is the danger that Linkletter courted.
B. Benefits
When we tum to the question of what benefits the Linkletter Court
reaped from its Faustian bargain, the answer is somewhat surprising.
Whatever the merits or demerits of its approach as a general matter,
Linkletter astonishingly failed to achieve its primary purpose: to
distinguish between direct and collateral review. In place of the
conventional rule that courts should generally decide cases according to
their best current understanding of the law, Linkletter announced that
"retroactivity" would be governed by a three-factor test: (1) whether
retroactive application serves the purpose of the new rule, (2) whether the
parties relied on the old rule, and (3) what the effect of retroactive
application would be.39
Applying these factors to Linkletter's case, the Court concluded that
prospectivity was the appropriate result. The exclusionary rule was meant
to deter unconstitutional searches, a purpose which would not be served by
applying the rule to searches conducted under WoljJ. According to the
Court, states had "relied on Wolff and followed its command."40 And
ordering new trials in untold numbers of concluded cases would plainly
create disruptive effects.
The application of the Linkletter test to Linkletter seems relatively
straightforward, though it was not without its critics.41 But its broader use
presents a glaring problem the Court did not acknowledge: applying the
Linkletter test to Mapp would likewise have required prospective
application, on the same grounds or even a fortiori, since the search in
Mapp occurred before that in Linkletter.42 None of the factors the Court
identified distinguished between the contexts of direct and collateral
review. Consequently, though the Court announced that the rule of
retroactive application on direct review was settled, the test it adopted
washed that rule away.
38. See Jack M. Balkin, The Basic Structure of Constitutional Interpretation and the
Limits of Interpretive Theory (Apr. 12, 2006), Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/04Ibasic-
structure-of-constitutional.html.
39. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 479, 636 (1965).
40. Id. at 637.
41. See id. at 646-49 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 641-42 (Black, J., dissenting).
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It is hard to imagine that the Court was wholly ignorant of that fact.
Justice Black's dissent suggested it. So, later, did Mishkin.43 And willful or
not, the ignorance could not be sustained. When other cases came along on
direct review, the Court had to confront the fact that its chosen test led to
prospectivity in that context as well. Its reaction to that none-too-surprising
revelation-and how it eventually managed to glean some benefit from
Mishkin's wisdom-is the subject of the next part. The point of this one is
that Mishkin's dim assessment of Linkletter was correct: the decision
offered little in the way of benefits to offset its substantial costs. In fact, the
story is sadder still: Linkletter, by introducing the concept of retroactivity,
created the very problem (how to distinguish between direct and collateral
review) that it set out to solve.44 Linkletter managed only to set the Court
off on its retroactivity odyssey.
III
LINKLETTER'S AFrERMATH
Linkletter created an unstable situation. The inconsistency between its
test and the rule of automatic retroactivity for direct review, coupled with
the Court's inability to distinguish between the two contexts, meant that
either the new test or the old rule would have to give way. Pushing forward
might have seemed more productive than pulling back, and rather than
rethink Linkletter, the Court expanded it. In Stovall v. Denno, it decided
that while new rules would continue to be applied in the case that
announced them, the Linkletter test would henceforth govern both direct
and collateral review.45
I am surprised that Stovall's "selective prospectivity" is not more
widely considered an abomination.46 Linkletter generated the criticism that
the treatment of individuals presenting claims to the Supreme Court should
not depend upon the procedural posture of the case.47 The complaints were
valid, given that Linkletter had offered no reason why procedural posture
should matter. But the reconciliation that Stovall offered was even worse.
When a new rule was announced and applied but subsequently held to be
prospective, only one case would be treated differently from the rest. But it
would be a case absolutely indistinguishable from a large number of the
43. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 74-75. Mishkin did, however, predict that the Court would adhere
to the rule of retroactivity on direct review, see id. at 76 (discussing Griffin), confidence that turned out
to be misplaced. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49 (discussing selective prospectivity).
44. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1124 (stating that Linkletter "did not offer the
best possible response to a difficult new problem. It created the problem and offered a plainly
inadequate response").
45. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
46. Among the academics who seem to endorse it, one finds persons of good faith and great
intelligence. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
47. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1091 n.84 (citing sources).
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Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,679 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,262-63 (1969).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 262.
others: the new rule would be applied in one case on direct review, and in
that one alone. The Court's explicit refusal to treat like cases alike is
perhaps the closest it has come to an open abdication of the judicial role.48
Indeed, the Stovall approach proved unsustainable. Starting in 1969,
Justice Harlan offered a different approach. He argued that the nature of
the judicial function required that a new rule, if once applied on direct
review, be thereafter applied to all cases on direct review. "Simply fishing
one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of
similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule
constitute an indefensible departure from this model ofjudicial review."49
However, Harlan would have treated habeas petitions differently.
Drawing heavily on Mishkin's analysis, Justice Harlan argued that the
purposes of federal habeas corpus review made it generally appropriate to
judge state-court convictions, by the legal standards in effect at the time
those convictions became final. Habeas, Harlan pronounced, served
primarily to deter constitutional violations, as "a necessary additional
incentive to trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards."50 Just as the Linkletter Court had concluded with respect to the
exclusionary rule, Harlan reasoned that deciding habeas petitions under
new rules of constitutional criminal procedure would not serve this
purpose.
New substantive constitutional law-law that placed "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe"-eonstituted an exception, and should
govern in habeas cases. 51 So, too, said Harlan, should new rules of criminal
procedure that enhanced the reliability of the "fact-finding procedures."52
48. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921) ("It will
not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between
another."). Another contender is the announcement that a particular ruling shall have no precedential
value but be good for one case only, a description that might be applied either to Bush v. Gore, 531
U.s. 98 (2000), or to some circuits' practice of designating opinions as unpublished or nonprecedential
and forbidding litigants to cite them. The Supreme Court's rejection of Stovall rests on constitutional
grounds and provides a strong argument against designating opinions as nonprecedential. See Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) ("After we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the
integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct
review."). See also Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (striking down a no-
citation rule as inconsistent with the judicial power), vacated as moot 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). The question of whether no-citation rules are constitutional has itself been mooted by the
Supreme Court's recent promulgation of a rule requiring the circuits courts to allow citation of
unpublished opinions. See Bennett L. Gershman, At Last, A Citability Rule, NAT'L LJ. 26, May 22,
2006.
49.
50.
5!.
52.
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In this he precisely followed Mishkin,.who had argued that courts should
"assess the validity of a conviction, no matter how long past, by any
current constitutional standards which have an intended effect of enhancing
the reliability of the guilt-determining process."53 Unfortunately, Harlan
later amended his second category to include only procedures so
fundamental to fairness as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"-a phrase that has never provided workable guidance.54
The first translation of Mishkin's article into judicial opinion appeared
.only as a dissent, but the appeal of his ideas was hard to deny. Like a
popular book, they obtained wider release. In 1987, the Court began the
process of bringing its doctrine into line with Justice Harlan's
recommendations. Griffith v. Kentucky55 accepted his recommendation for
the treatment of direct review, and Teague v. Lane56 extended the
endorsement, pronouncing that habeas cases would generally be governed
by the law in effect at the time the convictions became fina1. 57
Translation shares roots with betrayal, and it carries the risk of
unfortunate transformation. Teague proved no exception. Teague combined
Justice Harlan's two procedural exceptions, granting retroactive effect only
to new procedural rules that both contributed to the accuracy of the verdict
and lurked within ordered liberty. It also adopted a different conception of
the "new rule." Where Harlan saw a narrow category of cases, Teague
included any result "not dictated by precedent."58 As a majority of the
Court stated later in Butler v. McKeller, the definition of "new rule"
"validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions."59 On this approach, a rule is new if it is "susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds."60
In 1996, Congress entered the game, largely codifying Teague in the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).61 Among other
things, the AEDPA restricted habeas relief for claims decided on the merits
by state courts to cases in which the state court decision was "contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."62 Though the
53. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 82.
54. For similar criticism of the "fundamental right" prong of Harlan's approach, see Note,
Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1642 (2005).
55. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
56. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
57. Unfortunately, by this point the palimpsest of opinion had descended over the initial article,
and Griffith and Teague cite Harlan's opinions rather than Mishkin's superior original.
58. Teague, 489 U.S. at 30 I.
59. 494 U.S. 407,414(1990).
60. Id.at415.
61. Pub. L. No. 104-132, codified at various sections of 28 U.S.C.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I).
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meaning of this language, like the Teague "new rule" standard itself,
sparked considerable dispute,63 the basic principles are clear. Federal courts
in habeas cases must compare state court decisions to the law existing at
the time the state decision was rendered, and only to the law announced by
the Supreme Court. These basic outlines are sufficient to assess our current
circumstances.
IV
WHERE WE STAND: AN ASSESSMENT
A. Direct Review
The Court's approach to cases on direct review remains the one
announced in Griffith: the "integrity ofjudicial review" requires that a rule
applied in one case on direct review be applied to all similar subsequent
cases.64 It is hard to see how any other approach could be consistent with
the Court's obligation to decide cases correctly. Admittedly, however, such
an approach may lead to disruption when the Court breaks new ground. At
any moment, many cases are at some stage between first trial and final
appeal. Blanket retroactivity on direct review would seem to require
reversal of many trial level decisions correct under settled law at the time
they were rendered.
Appearances, however, can deceive. Courts utilize several devices to
withhold relief in practice even while honoring Griffith's command in
principle. As Toby Heytens puts it, "[f]ull retroactivity in form has
degenerated into a significant amount ofnonretroactivity in fact."65
Forfeiture rules, which bar litigants from later raising claims they
have failed to assert in a timely fashion,66 are the most widely-used device.
Forfeiture has the potential to be extremely powerful in reducing the
number of litigants who can take advantage of new rules. Precisely because
the rules are new, litigants are unlikely to have asserted them at trial.
Most commentary is critical of such use of forfeiture, and rightly SO.67
Forfeiture rules are not designed with the circumstance of law-changing
decisions in mind. Their core purpose is to promote compliance with
claim-presentation rules, which in tum "further efficiency and fairness to
participants by ensuring that additional proceedings will not be required
63. For a valuable and insightful analysis of the issues posed by § 2254(d)(I) and other sections
of the AEDPA, and their interaction with retroactivity analysis, see A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive
Application of "New Rules" and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2002). For the disputes, see, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
64. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S 314, 322-23 (1987).
65. Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE LJ. 922,
979 (2006).
66. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).
67. See Heytens, supra note 65; Meir Katz, Note, Plainly Not "Error": Adjudicative
Retroactivity on Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979 (2004).
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because of issues that could have been, but were not, dealt with the first
time around."68 In the paradigm case of a new rule, though-where the
Supreme Court overturns its prior precedent-"timely" trial presentation of
the claim is frivolous (because the prior precedent foreclosed it), and
penalizing litigants for failing to raise frivolous claims serves neither
fairness nor efficiency. Thus, a blanket use of forfeiture makes little sense.
However, forfeiture is not inexorable. Federal courts can correct
"plain errors" even if the relevant claim was not asserted at the appropriate
time.69 A decision contrary to the new rule is plainly erroneous, assuming
that the plainness of error should be assessed according to the law at the
time of appeal.70 Thus, courts can use forfeiture to prevent broad disruption
while also using plain error analysis to grant relief in appropriate cases.
Excusing forfeitures where doing so would further the new rule's purpose
would produce sensible results in those cases, albeit in an ad hoc fashion71
Even this refined approach proves suboptimal, however, because the
predictable consequence is inefficiency in other cases. Hoping to preserve
the possibility of benefiting from new rules whose purposes are not served
by application in their case, litigants will raise and repeat arguments that
lower courts are obliged by binding authority to reject. 72
If forfeiture doctrine generally should not prevent litigants from the
"untimely" assertion of claims based on new law,73 how can the Court
control the disruption of legal transitions? Some argue that the Court
should not try to, because the costs of disruption are vital in restraining
judges.74 But unless one has a rather dark view of judges' ability to weigh
68. Heytens, supra note 65, at 958.
69. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 52(b).
70. One might argue instead that error should be determined by reference to law existing at the
time of trial. Consistent with my belief that courts should generally decide legal issues according to
their best current understanding of the law, see Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1117, I think
that the law at the time of appeal provides the appropriate referent. Accord United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 632 (2002); Heytens, supra note 65, at 959.
71. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1131-34 (advocating purpose-based analysis).
The Supreme Court suggested something similar in its analysis of Apprendi error in United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). There it granted that the error (failing to charge and prove a specific
quantity of drugs) was plain but found that because the evidence relating to quantity was overwhelming
and uncontroverted, the error did not seriously affect the "fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." [d. at 633.
72. In addition to inefficiency, other undesirable consequences include the possibility of diverting
attorney resources from valid arguments, weakening those arguments by associating them with
foreclosed ones, antagonizing the judge, and earning sanctions. See Heytens, supra note 65, at 961-62.
73. Heytens provides a compelling analysis of the circumstances under which forfeiture is
appropriate, concluding that it should typically not bar claims when trial-time law was clearly
unfavorable but should when the law was merely unclear. See Heytens, supra note 65, at 959-72. The
analysis works in terms of the purpose of claim-presentation rules, but one might also say that the
resolution oflegal unclarity should generally not be understood to create a new rule.
74. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare
decisis."); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1961) (Black, J., concurring/dissenting) ("one
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stare decisis appropriately, requiring them to impose pointless costs75 on
society in order to announce new rules seems undesirable.76 Among those
who believe that minimizing disruption is desirable two main proposals
have emerged.
The most recent, put forward by Toby Heytens, suggests a return to
the Warren Court's nonretroactivity jurisprudence-in particular, the
selective prospectivity of Stovall v. Denno.?? Heytens observes that
forfeiture rules are poorly adapted to manage disruption and, moreover, are
subject to the same objections as nonretroactivity.78 He praises
nonretroactivity, on a relative basis, for confronting the relevant issues
candidly, and chooses selective prospectivity because it avoids the advisory
opinion problem that plagues full prospectivity and, more importantly,
preserves the incentives of litigants to raise novel arguments. 79
Earlier, Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer argued for a similar
approach, suggesting a remedial analysis that applied new rules of
constitutional law but withheld remedies in appropriate cases based on
Linkletter-type considerations of purpose and effect.80 Like Heytens, Fallon
and Meltzer intimated that the most desirable regime might end up
approximating selective prospectivity.8!
Both proposals are correct in arguing that the problem of disruption
should be confronted squarely by a doctrine designed to handle it, rather
than through the subterfuge or ad hocery of forfeiture. Of the two
proposals, I prefer remedial analysis because it can be applied within what
I have termed the decision-time framework, which directs courts to apply
their best current understanding of the law to all cases. That is, it can
operate within a framework that does not use the concepts of retroactivity
or nonretroactivity at all-and as the concepts have brought us nothing but
trouble, abandonment would be a step forward.
of the great inherent restraints upon this Court's departure from the field of interpretation to enter that
of lawmaking has been the fact that its judgments could not be limited to prospective application");
Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application ofJudicial Decisions, 26 HARV.
1.L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 856-57 (2003) (suggesting that the sort of disruption prospective application
aims to avoid is in fact an indication that the new rule "should simply be rejected as bad law").
75. As by applying new rules of law to cases in which application does not serve their purpose-
for instance, excluding from evidence confessions obtained voluntarily but without Miranda warnings
prior to the Miranda decision.
76. A somewhat more sophisticated version of this argument suggests that reducing disruption
(as through prospectivity) skews the stare decisis analysis by eliminating reliance interests the Court
ought properly to weigh. See Shannon, supra note 74, at 872. It seems to me, however, that to the
extent these reliance interests are not disrupted, they need not be weighed.
77. See Heytens, supra note 65, at 983-990.
78. [d. at 979-82.
79. [d. at 983-90.
80. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel 1. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
81. See id. at 1806.
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Equally serious, all fOnTIS of prospectivity are fraught with serious
constitutional difficulties. Pure prospectivity closely resembles an advisory
opinion,82 and, in its selective variant, it seems both unjudicial and a literal
denial of the equal protection of the laws.83 This argument against
selectivity remains even if it is achieved through remedial analysis. Thus, I
conclude that prospective results should be achieved through a remedial
calculus, and such results must be pure and not selective.84
B. Collateral Review
In the direct review context, the Court has followed Mishkin's
wisdom through Harlan and largely given up on the nonretroactivity
experiment-which is to say, it has resumed treating cases the way it did
for hundreds of years. 85 The main possible improvement to the current
approach on direct review-eontrolling disruption through remedial
analysis rather than forfeiture-is relatively minor. But collateral review
presents more problems.
i. The Shock ofthe New
The extremely broad conception of newness embraced by Teague and
its progeny produced two undesirable consequences. First, by refusing to
allow relief based on new rules whenever the newly-resolved issue was
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds,"86 the Court has
effectively told habeas courts to defer to state court interpretations of
federal law. A habeas court will not disrupt state judgments that are "good-
82. In defense of prospectivity, one might argue that it is not much different from dictum. But
dictum is not binding precisely because courts have authority to say what the law is only in the context
of deciding concrete disputes. Prospectivity, one could say, is an attempt to produce binding
dictum: the court announces that a particular rule of law takes effect not in the case before it but in
some other (future) case. But binding dictum does not exist, and neither should pure prospectivity.
Admittedly, a court could achieve much the same result by foreshadowing through heavy-handed use
of ordinary dictum, but that is simply one more reason why prospectivity is not needed.
83. Giving one person the benefit of a particular rule of law but denying it to another identically
situated person: what could be a plainer violation? In federal court, of course, the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause would be at issue, but even if this had not been held to include an equal protection
component, deciding like cases differently also seems a straightforward due process violation.
84. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1132. The most obvious risk in such an
approach is that it will discourage litigants from pressing novel arguments, but as long as the calculus is
not perfectly predictable, this risk seems manageable. See id. Another problem is that not all contexts
lend themselves to remedial analysis as well as constitutional criminal procedure-if the question is the
validity of a statute, for instance, it is hard to imagine a "remedial analysis" that would hold the statute
invalid but enforce it nonetheless. See id. at 1108.
85. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years"). The difference is that the Court
now has the concept of retroactivity, but the concept does no real mischief in the context of direct
review.
86. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
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faith interpretations of existing precedents"87-even if a subsequent
decision reveals that the "good-faith interpretation" was wrong. This
expansive concept of newness protects not only state court decisions that
were clearly correct under settled trial-time law (such as decisions
allowing the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence between
Wolf and Mapp), but also decisions that, though reasonable, turn out to
have been incorrect according to the best understanding of trial-time law.
Suppose that there exist two reasonable answers to an unsettled
question of federal law. Two state courts diverge on the question, and the
federal Supreme Court subsequently resolves it. Unless one believes that
federal law exists in an indeterminate quantum flux until announced by the
Supreme Court, one of those state court decisions is wrong when rendered.
But neither can be disturbed on habeas, no matter what the Supreme Court
says. Wrong but reasonable decisions survive collateral review. 88
Deferential federal review of state court rulings on questions of
federal law might seem obviously mistaken and improper.89 However, the
deference follows from one element of Harlan's approach to retroactivity
issues on collateral review. That approach stemmed from his analysis of
the purpose of habeas as a deterrent: "a necessary additional incentive for
trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings
in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards."90 Testing
state decisions for good faith rather than correctness does deter
misbehavior or disregard of federal rights.
What is lost when habeas is viewed purely as a deterrent, of course, is
its error-correction function. Habeas allows state court criminal defendants
to present their federal claims in a federal forum. In principle, a federal
forum is available on direct review, since defendants convicted in state
court can petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. But the promise of
federal direct review is more apparent than real, given that the Supreme
Court sensibly spends its limited institutional resources on divisive and
unsettled legal issues rather than reviewing the application of established
87. /d.at414.
88. More troubling, the decision that appears wrong but reasonable in light of trial-time Supreme
Court decisions will survive even if it is unreasonable and squarely foreclosed in light of trial-time
circuit law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I)'s reference to federal law "as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States." The restriction has led some to doubt the constitutionality of §
2254(d)(I). See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring); James S.
Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power "; The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking
Required ofArticle JlI Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
89. Bryant, supra note 63, argues that it is inconsistent with both the general principle of federal
superiority with respect to federal law and the command of AEDPA.
90. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969). In Desist, Harlan followed Mishkin and
identified the assurance of reliability as another purpose; however, this concern dropped away in
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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law.91 (Indeed, law clerks often recommend denial of a cert petItion
because a petitioner requests mere "error-correction."92) Thus, habeas is
most defendants' only meaningful chance for federal review.93 If that
review is deferential, federal rights are substantially at the mercy of state
courts. The appropriate level of alarm to accord this prospect is disputed,94
but it seems both odd and unfortunate that habeas courts may not upset
state court judgments that a subsequent Supreme Court decision has
revealed to have been wrong and that may have been clearly wrong at the
time of trial according to circuit law.
The second problem comes into view once we ask what vision of law
and judging might justify such a restriction on habeas relief. The apparent
premise of the Teague approach, and presumably of the AEDPA as well, is
that such state court decisions are not "revealed to have been wrong,"
because new rules create the law they declare. The state court decisions
represent not mistaken guesses as to what the law was, but paths not taken.
The decisions are wrong only if a new decision retroactively changes what
the law was at the time of triaI,95 Likewise, circuit law that correctly
anticipates the Court's decision is not authentic and binding, because only
the Court has the power to make law: it is accurate as a prediction but not
as a statement of the law. Implicit in Teague's definition of newness, then,
is the idea that the Court makes new law not simply when it overrules a
case or creates a clear break96 with existing precedent, but that it does so
any time it decides a question that was subject to debate among reasonable
minds.97
This is a particularly virulent strain of the view that Mishkin identified
in Linkletter. Not only does the Court make law, so that rules can have no
91. As Mishkin noted, "Reliance upon direct review by the Supreme Court as the exclusive
means of enforcement would be illusory. The sheer volume of the Court's work, not to mention
inadequacy of some state procedures for presenting these questions, would preclude adequate
vindication of these constitutional rights." Mishkin, supra note 2, at 86-87.
92. See generally ROBERT L. STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 219-86 (2002)
(discussing factors motivating grants of certiorari).
93. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 253-54 (1988);
James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct
Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997,2009-10 (1992).
94. For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Rolefor the Federal Judiciary, 36 VCLA L. REV. 233,238 (1988); Daniel J.
Meador, Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 347 (1986); Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth ofSuperiority, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999); Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1457 (2005).
95. This idea that "retroactive" decisions reach back to change what the law was is the concept
that I have argued should be eliminated from our jurisprudence.
96. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 V.S. 314, 324 (1987) (discussing "clear break").
97. Teague's concept of newness has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 80, at 1748.
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force until the Court announces them, but it does so in a great many cases.
No non-unanimous decision, and presumably few unanimous ones, will
qualify as the elaboration or unpacking of existing precedent, the making
plain of what lay already implicit in prior decisions. Instead, most
decisions are viewed as relatively unconstrained choices, and their rules are
not law until the lawmaking Court has spoken.
The second problem with Teague's understanding of newness, then, is
that it produces all the costs Mishkin attributed to Linkletter: it suggests
that many, if not most, judicial decisions are the product not of law and a
constraining mode of analysis but of judges exercising legislative-like
discretion. Harlan, like Mishkin, opposed this view. Harlan subscribed to a
model of judicial decisionmaking in which "many, though not all, of this
Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles
whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose
meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds
generation."98 On this view, decisions fairly traceable to existing precedent
are not new, even if they direct different results from those that obtained
under prior law.99 The Court should return to this understanding of newness
to mitigate the expressive harm of Teague.
ii. Exceptional Problems
In addition to its concept of newness, troubling for both its practical
consequences and its implicit view of the judicial process, Teague may be
questioned for its definition of the new rules eligible for application on
collateral review. Mishkin, Harlan, and Teague all agreed that new
substantive rules-rules that in Harlan's words place "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe"loo-should govern in habeas. This makes
good sense. If the state loses power to punish certain conduct in the future,
it also presumably loses power to continue to punish past instances of such
conduct, and continued detention violates the Constitution. 101
The appropriate treatment of new procedural rules is more
complicated. Mishkin suggested applying such new rules if they enhance
"the reliability of the conviction process for establishing factual guilt."lo2
Harlan, after originally accepting this formulation, replaced it with one that
urged application of such new rules as were "implicit in the concept of
98. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,263 (1969).
99. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1748 (stating that "[t]he conception of legal newness
implicit in Teague and its progeny is difficult to reconcile with the conception of the judicial role
embraced by Justice Harlan").
100. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring/dissenting).
101. For elaboration of this point, see Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1122-23.
102. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 81.
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ordered liberty." 103 Teague combined the two Harlan formulations, an
innovation with little obvious justification other than, perhaps, that a
conjunction is harder to satisfy than either element alone. l04 If that was
Teague's purpose, it has been achieved: no new procedural rule has yet
satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated that
none shall. 105
The use of the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" criterion has
been strongly criticized. 106 Although its purpose in retroactivity analysis is
unclear, the point may be to limit collateral relief to cases involving
violations of a sufficiently important or "real" procedural right rather than
a judicially-created rule. But if that is the motivation, recent scholarship
suggests a much more useful way of looking at the question.
Recent years, have seen an increase in attention to the distinction
between "operative propositions"-the Constitution's actual grants of
rights and powers-and "decision rules"-the rules that courts apply to
determine whether a right has been violated or a power exceeded. 107 For a
rough and ready example of the distinction, consider the Equal Protection
Clause. The clause itself does not tell courts to apply the different tiers of
scrutiny that have developed over the years. If we had to summarize its
meaning, we might say that it prohibits discrimination that is unjustified,
or, as the Court sometimes says, "invidious."108 If you accept that view, "no
invidious discrimination," would be the operative proposition; the tiers of
scrutiny would be decision rules. This distinction may help decide which
rules should be applied on collateral review.
103. Compare Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (endorsing reliability criterion) with Williams, 401 U.S. at
694 (endorsing Palko standard).
104. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989).
105. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 1096 and n.118.
106. See generally Note, supra note 54 (criticizing use of Palko standard, and advocating return to
reliability criterion alone).
107. Significant works employing the distinction were published in the 1970s, and those wishing
to trace it back farther can find antecedents in the nineteenth or even eighteenth century. See Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976); Lawrence Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212,
1213-15 (1978); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 128 (1798)
(suggesting that a judge should not strike a law down merely because he believes it unconstitutional,
but only if "the opposition between the constitution and the law [were] such that the judge feels a clear
and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other"). In recent times, Richard Fallon has
been one of the leaders in developing and analyzing the distinction. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR"
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). The terminology I use here is drawn
from Mitchell Berman's excellent and comprehensive Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV, I
(2005).
108. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (stating that "it is only invidious
discrimination which offends the Constitution"). See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (2005)
[hereinafter Roosevelt, Calcification] (discussing equal protection).
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First, consider the easiest case: a new rule relating to the contours of a
"substantive" operative proposition, one governing primary conduct.
Imagine that after initially holding that expressive flag-burning does not
count as "speech" for the purposes of the First Amendment, the Court
reverses itself. This is a decision about an operative proposition-the scope
of the Amendment's protection-and it is about substance, not procedure.
It presents an example of Harlan's first exception-a determination that
certain conduct cannot be punished-and it should clearly govern on
collateral review. People incarcerated for expressive flag-burning should
be able to win release even if their convictions became final before the
law-changing decision.
The appropriate treatment of new decision rules relating to primary
conduct is not quite as clear. For an example, consider the Court's decision
to adopt intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination in Craig v. Boren. 109
Should habeas relief be available to upset final state court convictions
based on discriminatory laws upheld under the more lenient rational basis
standard? To say that a state court used the wrong decision rule is not to
say that a litigant's right was violated. No decision rule is perfectly
accurate. Intermediate scrutiny may uphold some invidious sex
discrimination, and it may strike down some that is not invidious. Nor is
accuracy the sole concern. Particular decision rules may be adopted for a
wide variety of reasons-not just increasing accuracy, but also skewing
error-distribution or providing clear guidance to lower courts and
government actors. I 10
The reasons behind a particular rule are relevant to whether it should
govern on collateral review (and likewise to the remedial calculus I have
suggested should playa role on direct review).lll If a new decision rule is
desirable because it minimizes adjudicatory error by providing more
accurate determinations of whether a right was violated, application on
collateral review makes sense because serves that purpose. Heightened
scrutiny for sex-based discrimination meets that test. It is probably
motivated in large part by accuracy concerns and reflects a judgment that
such discrimination is highly likely to be invidious. llz If the goal is instead
to provide clear guidance for government officials, application makes less
sense, since that purpose cannot be served by application to already-
decided cases. 113 And if the new decision rule is desirable because
109. 429 U.s. 190 (1976).
110. For one attempt to set out particularly salient factors, see Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note
108, at 1658-66.
Ill. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
112. See generally Roosevelt, Calcification, supra note 108, at 1687-88.
113. See Berman, supra note 107, at 100 (noting relevance of distinction between "minimizing
adjudicatory error" and "providing better guidance for non-judicial actors" to retroactivity analysis). Of
course, more than one factor may be operating in any particular case. The Miranda rule, for instance,
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circumstances have changed, application will typically make very little
sense. 114
Thus the proper treatment of new substantive rules may not be as
clear-cut as most assume: in some cases, new decision rules relating to
substantive matters may not be appropriate for application on collateral
review. The same is true of procedural rules: the distinction between
decision rules and operative propositions suggests a more refined analysis
than Teague employs.
A new rule about a procedural operative proposition probably should
govern on collateral review. (For examples, consider the decisions in
Gideon v. Wainwright,115 finding a right to state-appointed counsel for
indigents in felony prosecutions under the Sixth Amendment and In re
Winship,116 reading the Due Process Clause to require that convictions be
based on proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.) This principle is to
some degree consistent with Teague, in that it could be seen as a
restatement of Harlan's "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
criterion. That test, articulated in Palko v. Connecticut,117 determined
which Bill of Rights provisions warranted incorporation against the states.
Its application governed whether a particular right existed (a question about
operative propositions), rather than what the best rules for implementation
of that right were (a question about decision rules). In that way Teague's
use of Palko resembles a first-cut rule that new operative propositions, but
not most new decision rules, should govern on collateral review. Thus,
TeagUe recognizes the correctness of the Supreme Court's collateral
application of cases like Gideon v. Wainwright and In re Winship, results
with which I agree. 118 As understood by the Teague Court, however, the
Palko standard would probably not allow application of a new rule
changing the scope of a previously recognized right-as, for instance, if
the Court were to broaden the scope of the behavior considered testimony
for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compulsory self-
likely does aim to reduce error (because it substitutes a more tractable question for the prior totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis) but it does so primarily by giving officials a clear rule to follow. Its
application to pre-Miranda interrogations, in which officials were unaware of the rule, will not enhance
accuracy but ralher produce a large number of errors in favor of exclusion. Miranda is a prime focus of
Berman's article, which includes many complexities elided here.
114. Imagine, for instance, that the Court had followed John Hart Ely's approach and employed
heightened scrutiny in the equal protection context in response to a burdened group's lack of political
power. As demographic shifts deprived a previously dominant group of majority status, the Court might
respond by increasing the level of scrutiny it applied to discrimination against that group. But applying
this decision rule to cases concluded before the shift occurred would make no sense, even though it
would likely fall into the conventional understanding of Harlan's "substantive" category.
115. 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (finding right to counsel for indigents in felony prosecutions).
116. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction).
117. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
118. See Ivan V. v. New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1973) (holding Winship retroactive); Pickelsimer v.
Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) (holding Gideon retroactive).
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incrimination. I would consider that new rule appropriate for collateral
application, so my suggested analysis also departs from Teague to some
degree.
A second justification for applying new rules about even procedural
operative propositions on collateral review comes from the view ofjudicial
decisionmaking endorsed by Mishkin and Harlan (though not Teague). A
Court creating a new decision rule can candidly admit that it is changing
the law. Deciding how best to implement constitutional meaning via
decision rules is within the authority of the Court. Creating new
constitutional meaning is not, and so a Court changing the law with respect
to operative propositions stands on firmer ground if it is willing to assert
that this is what the Constitution has always meant. The consequence of
that assertion is that prior inconsistent decisions were mistaken, and those
errors can be raised on collateral review.
This theoretical purity may carry the practical cost of disruption, but it
need not. As Fallon and Meltzer have argued, flexibility in the law of
remedies may allow the Court to grant that a particular operative
proposition did exist at the time of trial, and hence should govern on
collateral review, but still decline to overturn a state judgment in
appropriate cases. This remedial calculus would be the place to consider
whether the operative proposition relates to the reliability of the verdict, as
well as other factors such as the state's reliance interest and the impact on
the criminal justice system.
New decision rules about procedural requirements, on the other hand,
generally should not govern in collateral review. (The most obvious
example of such a new decision rule is probably Miranda v. Arizona. I 19)
This is not to say that they should be "given prospective effect." I have
argued elsewhere that courts should decide cases according to their best
current understanding of the law, and that the question of whether a rule
has "retroactive effect" should simply be excised from our doctrine. 120 But
since collateral review is concerned with the question of whether a decision
was correct when rendered, rather than whether the reviewing court would
reach the same decision, applying current law will not lead to the
overturning of judgments correct when rendered but resting on superseded
law. 121 As Mishkin put it, "the doctrine that a final judgment entered under
119. 384 U.s. 436 (2000).
120. See Roosevelt, Retroactivity, supra note 8, at 113\. At moments the Supreme Court seems to
have come close to this approach. See, e.g., Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999).
12\. See id. at 1120-22; Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to
Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 732 n.64 (1966) ("Direct review is considered part of the
original proceeding, whereas habeas corpus is independent."). The idea that some decisions can operate
"retroactively" to change what the law was, and thereby introduce error into proceedings correct when
conducted, is what creates the problem with collateral review, and the irony of Linkletter is that it was
Linkletter itself that introduced this idea.
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a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule is
long established ..."122 .
Again, concluding that a state court applied the wrong decision rule
does not imply that a litigant's rights were violated. The state court
decision may be correct not merely in regard to guilt or innocence but in
regard to the procedural rights at issue. Many' confessions extracted
without Miranda warnings, for instance, were perfectly voluntary.
Upsetting a state judgment on collateral review based on a new decision
rule relating to a procedural operative proposition should be relatively
rare-it should occur only when applying the new decision rule would
enhance accuracy in the determination of whether a constitutional right has
been violated, and when the possible violation of the underlying procedural
right demands a remedy. 123
V
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Case Study
Heytens' "transitional moment" is upon US. 124 Until relatively recently,
juries could play a minor role in criminal prosecutions, deciding only
whether the defendant violated a broad proscription such as distributing a
controlled substance. A judge decided punishment based on sentencing
factors that were never submitted to the jury and needed to be found by
only a preponderance ofthe evidence. 125 In the summer of 2000, the Court
decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, holding that, other than prior convictions,
"any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 126
Apprendi clearly raised questions about the validity of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, adopted in 1987, and similar state systems. Though
lower courts decided that these approaches survived Apprendi, the
Supreme Court eventually declared that it disagreed. In 2004, Blakely v.
122. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 77. Indeed, the Supreme Court has announced that one variant of
the doctrine has constitutional force: while Congress can plainly change law and thereby change the
outcome of pending cases, it cannot pass a new law and order courts to re-open final cases in order to
apply the new rule. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (\ 995) (striking down on separation of
powers grounds a law attempting to reinstate dismissed cases).
J23. That is, applying a new decision rule for a procedural operative proposition on collateral
review makes sense as error-correction when both a) the new decision rule does a better job (in the
instant case) than the old one of determining whether the operative proposition has been violated; and
b) the possible violation ofthe procedural right is sufficiently serious to warrant a remedy.
124. Heytens, supra note 65. The following exposition of recent cases draws from Heytens'
account, id. at 934-40.
125. See id.
126. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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Washington 127 struck down Washington State's Sentencing Reform Act.
The Sentencing Reform Act was in many respects indistinguishable from
the federal system, and Blakely notably rejected the rationale used by many
courts to shield such systems from invalidation under Apprendi: that there
was a difference between exceeding a statutory maximum and constraining
judicial discretion within a range of punishment authorized by statute. As
Justice Scalia put it, "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."128
Without that distinction, the Federal Guidelines' chances of survival
seemed slim indeed. 129 In Z005', in United States v. Booker, 130 a five-Justice
majority confirmed the conventional wisdom that, as binding rules, the
Guidelines were unconstitutional. However, a different five-Justice
majority followed the invalidation with the somewhat less predictable step
of deciding to solve the problem by leaving the Guidelines in force as
advisory rather than mandatory.13!
The Apprendi-Blakely-Booker triad obviously poses great risk of
disruption. As Heytens puts it, "the Court's chosen solution meant that
virtually every federal sentence handed down during the last twenty years
had been imposed in an illegal fashion."132 And so, once again, the question
of who can benefit from these rules is taking center stage. Indeed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Booker question in the 2006 Term,
only to find that the petitioner's failure to obtain authorization for a second
habeas petition prevented merits resolution.!33 In what follows, I will
discuss how the question should be analyzed and resolved. 134
Under conventional retroactivity analysis, the first issue is to
determine which of these cases creates a new rule. Apprendi fairly clearly
does, for it departs quite substantially from earlier cases such as United
States v. Watts,135 which held that conduct for which the defendant was
acquitted by a jury would nonetheless create a sentencing enhancement if
found by the judge, and Almendarez-Torres v. United States,136 which
upheld an enhancement based on the fact of prior conviction even though
that fact was neither charged in the indictment nor part of the offense to
127. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
128. [d. at 303.
129. Most commentators, including the Department of Justice, expected the federal guidelines to
fall. See. e.g., R. Craig Green, Apprendi's Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1155, 1155 n.4 (2005).
130. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
13 I. [d. at 757.
132. Heytens, supra note 65, at 940.
133. See Burton v. Stewart, 127 S.Ct. 793,796 (2007).
134. Of course, I entertain no illusions that the Court will be moved by my suggestions; after all, it
took decades to adopt Mishkin's, and it still hasn't gotten them entirely right.
135. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
136. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
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which the defendant pleaded guilty.137 The status of Blakely and Booker is
less clear. The Teague standard would presumably lead to the conclusion
that both are new, since neither was unanimous. The Mishkin/Harlan view
would almost certainly conclude that Booker is not new, though the correct
characterization ofBlakely is open to dispute.
Arguably, the Teague analysis also suggests that none of the cases
meets the "implicit in ordered liberty" requirement for application on
collateral review, especially given the Court's intimation that this test is
essentially impossible to satisfy.138 But the contrary argument is at least
plausible. The right to have a jury find the facts that determine a sentence
beyond a reasonable doubt does seem fundamental, much akin to the In re
Winship 139 rule that first required the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. And indeed, the exchange between the majority and the dissent in
Schriro v. Summerlin,140 concerning the retroactive application of
Apprendi's offspring Ring v. Arizona 141 offers intriguing tea leaves. Ring
applied Apprendi to capital sentencing, requiring a jury (rather than a
judge) to find the aggravating factors that made defendants eligible for
death. Schriro held Ring non-retroactive on collateral review because it
failed the "substantially improving accuracy" element of the Teague test.
The majority said very little about the "implicit in ordered liberty"
criterion, and the dissent argued that this amounted to a concession. 142 If so,
the only question is whether the Apprendi rule remedies "an impermissibly
large risk that the innocent will be convicted."143 It clearly does if one
focuses on the question of whether the defendant is innocent of the crime
for which he was sentenced, rather than of some lesser offence.
But how Teague applies is for the Supreme Court to say. My concern
here is the ideal world, and I have said already that Teague's analysis can
be improved. One suggestion is to ask only whether the new rule
substantially enhances the reliability of the verdict, and from that
perspective, these rules would probably qualify for application on collateral
review. 144 I prefer to start, as does Teague, by asking whether the rules are
new and whether they are substantive or procedural. I would then analyze
the matter in terms of the distinction between decision rules and operative
137. For a more detailed analysis of pre-Apprendi cases, see Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment
Under the Constitution, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 221 (2004).
138. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (stating that "we believe it unlikely that many
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge"). Consistent with that hint, federal circuit
courts have generally held that these cases do not apply retroactively. See 35 GEO. LJ. 655, 655 (2006);
Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. I, 51 (2006).
139. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
140. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
141. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
142. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
144. This is the argument of Note, supra note 54.
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proposItIOns. New rules that relate to operative propositions, whether
substantive or procedural, should always be available on collateral review
in the sense that earlier inconsistent decisions should be deemed incorrect.
I would determine whether the error in those decisions justifies overturning
them through a case-by-case analysis of the sort proposed by Fallon and
Meltzer. The adoption of new decision rules, whether related to substance
or procedure, does not contain a similar implication of error, and collateral
relief should be available in more limited circumstances. 145
From that perspective, the matter appears as follows. I grant that
Apprendi is new, but I am less certain about Blakely and am quite confident
that Booker is not. (One guide here is the performance of lower courts,
which did not reach the Blakely result after Apprendi but, in the appellate
decisions in Booker and Fanfan, anticipated the Booker decision.) All the
decisions strike me as procedural, though it could be argued that they
amount to a holding that enhancements are actually elements, and therefore
relate to primary conduct. 146 But the rules they announce are not decision
rules; they are operative propositions. Like Winship before them, they
articulate actual constitutional rights, not rules to determine when rights
have been violated. 147
Thus, there should certainly not. be a blanket rule stating that these
decisions are unavailable on collateral review. According to the view of the
Constitution they set out, defendants convicted under the now-invalid
systems have suffered actual constitutional injury. These injuries are not
trivial. Horror stories about the consequences of the Federal Guidelines are
legion. Defendants have been sentenced based on facts that the jury
expressly did not find, and they have received sentences prescribed for
crimes other than the ones in their convictions or guilty pleas. 148 If those
circumstances violate the Constitution now, it takes a hardened realist to
argue that they did not violate the Constitution when they occurred.
To summarize, assuming that Apprendi and Blakely are both new
procedural rules, they should nonetheless be given retroactive effect (more
precisely, courts should recognize that earlier inconsistent decisions
contain error) because both decisions are about operative propositions, not
decision rules. But all that only gets us to the stage of raising the remedial
145. See supra, text accompanying notes 108-113, 118-122.
146. See. e.g., Christopher S. Strauss, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme Court's Retroactivity
Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners' Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1220, 1242-45, 1260 (2003). But see Schriro, 542 U.S. at 354 (rejecting argument that Ring modified
the elements of offense under Arizona law).
147. See Berman, supra note 107, at 139 n.404 (explaining that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
rule is an operative proposition).
148. For a sampling of such criticism, see, for example, Melissa M. McGrath, Federal Sentencing
Law: Prosecutorial Discretion in Determining Departures Based on Defendant's Cooperation Violates
Due Process, 15 S. ILL. U. LJ. 321 (1990); David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War On
Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211 (2004).
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question. In some cases, perhaps many, Apprendi error will be harmless. If
there is no dispute over the facts underlying an enhancement, for instance,
the defendant has hardly suffered: an injury ,requiring redress. 149 But when
such a dispute exists-or when the defendant was actually acquitted of the
"relevant conduct" subsequently used to enhance his sentence-the
resulting injustice warrants either requiring the state to undertake the proof
it neglected or (in the case of acquittal) reducing the sentence. Such errors
do not quite present the specter of innocents languishing in jail, for the
defendants are guilty of something. But they may well not be guilty of the
offense for which they were sentenced. That is a serious problem.
This analysis suggests that the availability of Apprendi relief should
be determined not by a blanket rule of retroactivity or nonretroactivity, but
by a case-by-case remedial analysis that considers whether an actual
injustice was done. Blakely, if deemed a new rule, should be treated
similarly. In the case of state convictions, habeas courts should ask whether
the error produced a substantial injustice. For federal convictions, Booker
offers an easier solution. By holding that the Guidelines could persist in an
advisory capacity, the Booker Court indicated that the proper remedy is
simply to allow the trial court to determine whether it would have imposed
the same sentence in its discretion under an advisory regime. Allowing
habeas petitioners this chance at a reduced sentence will impose some
administrative burdens, for trial courts may have to reconsider a very large
number of sentences. But each reconsideration is relatively trivial, and it
should not outweigh the possibility of remedying substantial injustice in
those cases in which courts would have imposed lesser sentences if they
had the choice. This approach would strike the balance we should strive for
in such cases, the one Paul Mishkin identified over forty years ago: the
"balance between the sense of injustice and the needs of organized
society."150
149, This is essentially the conclusion the Supreme Court has reached via plain error and forfeiture
analysis. See United States v, Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
150. Mishkin, supra note 2, at 100,
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